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as to any poet, the only works of his own that bring true satisfaction are those that he has still to do" (p. 317).

Perhaps the most striking feature of the book is the relegation of natural science and mathematics from the field of theory to that of action. This attitude is based upon the view that the concepts of science and mathematics are fictitious. But to come to a specific point, it is not wholly clear why a concept like "house" should not be regarded as possessing universality; having a definite meaning, like all other concepts, it applies to a definite set of objects, but the number of these is not limited, for the concept house applies to all possible, as well as actual, houses. And in general, instead of adopting a definition of science and mathematics which is also an evaluation of them, would it not have been more desirable to distinguish them from philosophy and history by reference not to the mode of knowledge but to the subject-matter—to define, say, history, as dealing with the particular and changing elements and science with the constant and universal elements of reality? Such a definition would not prejudge the question of the cognitive value of that which it defines and indeed would allow full scope for the claims which, undeniably, both science and mathematics make upon the intellect.

The point of view in the author's treatment of logic is thoroughly philosophical and systematic. Assertions in this volume are defended by references to theses expounded and adopted in the author's other works, and theses that are purely metaphysical in purport. The argument moves with that ease—and we may add, dogmatism, on some occasions—which come from the consciousness that any given stage in the argument is completely bound up with and determined by the stages already covered.

In most forms of knowledge, there have been two stages, the philosophical and the scientific, the latter following upon the heels of the former; thus, physics, psychology, chemistry, have all been "philosophies" before, but are sciences at the present. The same movement has appeared in the growth of logical thinking. Hegel is the preeminent representative of the purely philosophical approach to logic, whereas the present tendency to identify logic with mathematics represents the gradual development of logic into an exact science. Croce is a self-conscious upholder of the philosophical approach to logic, and the present work constitutes a forceful, clear, and on the whole, notable contribution to the treatment of logic as a philosophical study. Δ

A Defence of Idealism: Some Questions and Conclusions. By *May Sinclair.* London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1917. Price, 12s. net.

This entertaining volume of essays opens with a chapter on the Pan-Psychism of Samuel Butler. Miss Sinclair traces out Butler's destruction of the theory of "personal identity," and discusses his view that habit and instinct are but memory and that both presuppose knowledge and volition on the part of the individual that displays them. Butler's theories and those of the new psycho-analytic school stand in an interesting relation. Butler, of course, held that the only sane and perfect life is the unconscious life. The psycho-analysts, on the other hand, seem to assume that we must live consciously if we would live well. An interesting account is given of the conceptions made use of by the psycho-analysts and it is shown that Butler's work helps to an understanding of some of the features of the investigations now being undertaken by this school of psychologists.

Miss Sinclair is very happy in her treatment of mysticism, the chapter entitled "The New Mysticism" being quite a graceful study of the subject. Especially interesting is her discussion of the relation between mysticism and monism. Much trouble is taken to show that it is not the case that "Monism is the offshoot of mysticism, a disease of thought reverting to a savage ancestry" (p. 277) but rather that mysticism owes much more to philosophy than philosophy could ever owe to it. But another aspect of mysticism is also treated, and it is this aspect that is responsible for the increase of interest in the subject which is to be found at the present time. The results of psychoanalytic investigations are applied to the experiences of such mystics as Lady Julian of Norwich, St. Catherine of Genoa, St. John of the Cross, and St. Teresa. We cannot but feel that the interpretations of their religious experiences offered must make them turn in their graves. But it is intensely interesting subject, and the treatment of certain religious experiences in the light of modern knowledge of abnormal psychology seems to be a step in the direction of a healthier point of view with regard to mysticism and the various problems involved.

But the reader to whom the subject of mysticism does not specially appeal may turn to other topics. There is a chapter on vitalism, a chapter on psychology, one on pragmatism and humanism, and one on the new realism. The discussion of the new realism is light and amusing: it is a pity that the treatment of some of the most important points is not as full as the eager reader might desire. Reference is made to the work of Mr. Russell, Professor Whitehead, Professor Alexander, and the American Six Realists, who are amusingly compared to a colony of the Young Men's Christian Association. But why is Mr. Russell's treatise *The Principles of Mathematics* referred to continually as *Principia Mathematica,* which is the name of Mr. Russell and Professor Whitehead's logic? Emphasis is rightly laid on the importance of the method employed in the new realism. Once again it is explained that in the idealistic philosophy, formal logic could not cope with mathematical deductions, and so idealists condemned mathematics. It is indeed stated that "all idealisms, constructive or destructive, are based on the ultimate inability of mathematics to defend its own position" (p. 179). In the course of her defense of idealism our author has therefore to show that, even now, no satisfactory account can be given of infinity and continuity and the various conceptions with which mathematics deals. And in this endeavor she does not succeed. First an account—from the point of view of an idealist, be it remembered— is given of the work of the mathematical logicians on continuity and infinity. In an easy style, our author suggests the kind of way in which Cantor, Russell, and Whitehead maintain that space and time are no longer internally refutable: but one feels that, in spite of brave attempts, it may still be a mystery to some readers how exactly the arguments run. To appreciate the cogency of such arguments, arguments which do in fact establish the thesis that space and time are not internally refutable, some slight knowledge of the modern theory of series is needed, and this is not given in the discussion: the result is that the man in the street is puzzled and the logician is unsatisfied. As a whetting of the appetite for further information, this light-handed treatment of difficult subjects may be useful. It is amusing to see the extraordinary and paradoxical conclusions at which philosophers can arrive when they try to treat mathematical subjects—which have of course a method of their own, adequate to deal with them—with the methods of the idealistic school. There must be some innate perversity in the minds of nearly all human beings that renders them unwilling to look at the problem of the infinite with moderate carefulness and good-will. Otherwise it would not have been left to the nineteenth century to produce the theory of infinity. And it would almost seem that it was not lack of knowledge of logic but something more fundamental which was responsible for the delay. For, even now, when the subject is ready to give up the secrets of the infinite to any one who takes the trouble to look into it, we find quick and capable thinkers arriving at the most nerve-ruining results about it. Thus our author arrives at five "fine, flourishing contradictions" (p. 256):

1. the contradiction of the infinite regress;
2. the contradiction of the non-serial series;
3. the contradiction of the positionless position;
4. the contradiction of the non-spatial spaces and non-temporal times;
5. the contradiction of the finite infinite.

Who would attempt to boil potatoes with the help of a knowledge of Greek, or to attack the problems of sociology with the apparatus of chemistry? Why then treat the technical developments of modern mathematical logic with the all-embracing intuitions of the idealistic philosopher?

Other aspects of the new realism are considered, especially the question of the externality of relations. Many a subtle and difficult point is lightened (if some are obscured) by an amusing jest or a pretty phrase. An exposition of what is called "The Monistic Theory of Reality" is given and Mr. Russell's criticism of the monistic theory of truth is examined and pronounced unsound, but as it seems to the reviewer for insufficient reasons. But in spite of her treatment of the new realism, Miss Sinclair has produced an amusing and in parts an interesting book—a book any philosopher would like to read on a Sunday afternoon.

Dorothy Wrinch.

Slav Achievement in Advanced Science. By *Branislav Petronievics*. Pp. 32. London: The American Book Supply Co., Ltd., 1917. Price, 1s. net.

After the Renaissance the order in time in which nations took part in continuing the work of the ancient Greeks is: Italy, France, England, Germany, Russia. Dr. Petronievics shows in this pamphlet that "not only Russia can boast of men of science comparable to the greatest among the peoples of Western Europe, but some are to be found even among the other Slav nations" (p. 5). The four men dealt with at some length are the Pole Niklas Kopernigk (Nicolas Copernicus, 1473-1543), the Russians Nikolay Ivanovitch Lobatchevski (1793-1856) and Dimitrije Ivanovitch Mendeljew (1834-1907), and the Serbo-Croat Rudjer Josif Boshcovic, usually known as Roger Boscovitch (1711-1787). The transcription of names is the author's. It is interesting that (p. 9) Copernicus, in his theory of the earth's daily motion about its axis, was, "as he himself acknowledged, following in the footsteps of the ancient Pythagoreans. His second principal theory, however, that the earth's movement around the sun together with all the other planets, was almost